A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten months.

However, the execution of the above punishment shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

Punishment of the crime

On November 28, 2014, around 10:30 on November 28, 2014, the Defendant, at the victim D’s second floor housing room located in Yongsan-gu Seoul, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, on the ground that E, the Defendant, who is the Defendant’s seat, takes away clothes located in the Defendant’s spoke, thereby piling up them up, and then, he called “if he gets off, he shall be only if he gets out of it.” The Defendant, while putting the clothes located in the Defendant’s spokele in both hand, she extended the period by attaching a string to the above spokes. However, the above E was immediately carried out.

As above, the Defendant tried to fire a building in which people exist by setting fire, but did not bring about such intent but did not commit an attempted crime.

Summary of Evidence

1. Partial statement of the defendant;

1. Each legal statement of witness E and D;

1. Application of statutes on field photographs;

1. Relevant Articles of the Criminal Act and Articles 174 and 164 (1) of the Criminal Act concerning the crime;

1. Article 25 (2) and Article 55 (1) 3 of the Criminal Act for mitigation of attempted crimes;

1. Article 53 or 55 (1) 3 of the Criminal Act for discretionary mitigation (i.e., circumstances favorable to the following reasons for sentencing):

1. Article 62 (1) of the Criminal Act (recognition of the favorable circumstances among the reasons for sentencing following the suspended sentence);

1. On the assertion of the defendant and his defense counsel under Article 62-2(1) and (2) of the Probation Criminal Act, the defendant and his defense counsel asserted that the defendant only carried clothes, and the defendant did not have any intention to prevent a fire to the structure by setting fire.

In order to establish the crime of fire-prevention against the present owner's building, even if there is dolusence as to the fact that the fire does not necessarily necessarily require the result of the fire or the final intention of the fire, and that the building, etc. may be destroyed by his own act, the intent may be recognized. The above evidence and the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this court can be recognized as follows, i.e., the present case: