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(영문) 대법원 2015.10.15 2014다63377
소유권이전등기
Text

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Intervenor, and the remainder are assessed against the Intervenor.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the grounds of appeal on the security defense of the clan, if the members of the clan regularly gather at a certain place on a fixed day each year in accordance with the rules or practices of the clan and are to deal with the religious affairs of the clan, it is not necessary to separately convene a clan meeting

(See Supreme Court Decision 93Da27703 delivered on September 30, 1994, etc.). The court below, based on the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, rejected the defendants' defense of safety, which is unlawful, since the plaintiff collected members of the clan immediately after the establishment of a clan every year in accordance with the practice of the plaintiff, and as such, the resolution that the general meeting of the clan dated November 25, 2012, which was held in accordance with the custom of the same clan, appointed W as the representative, was valid, on the ground that the lawsuit of this case was instituted by W without the plaintiff's power of representation.

Examining the records in accordance with the above legal principles, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the convening procedure of a clan general meeting, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

2. As to the grounds of appeal on the merits, the lower court held that each of the instant real estate was owned by the Plaintiff and entrusted only its name to a clan member, including the Defendant Intervenor’s assistance, inasmuch as the registration in the name of the Plaintiff, which was completed by the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (Act No. 4502, Nov. 30, 1992; hereinafter “Special Measures Act”) was not possible to complete the registration under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate, and thus, the presumption of registration was broken. In full view of the facts and circumstances as stated in its reasoning, it is reasonable to view that each of the instant real estate was a

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