1. The plaintiffs' lawsuits against the general meeting of the Korea Telecommunication Association against the defendant and the Korea Telecommunication Association against the defendant.

1. On March 19, 2012, the KCA (hereinafter referred to as the “Defendant CU”) rendered a judgment on March 19, 2012 that “Plaintiff A shall be dismissed from office as the head of the EU and shall be ordered from office at the EU.S. EA. EU to withdraw from office.”

Plaintiff

A appealed to this, but the general meeting of the Korea Culture & Arts Association of the Defendant (hereinafter “the general meeting of the Defendant”) declared on September 10, 2012 that the said appeal was dismissed on September 10, 2012 by the KCA No. 96-48.

On April 2, 2012, Defendant C's association rendered a judgment on April 2, 2012 that "the Plaintiff B shall dismiss the retired head office and order the withdrawal from the FIE to the office."

Plaintiff

B appealed, however, on September 10, 2012, the general assembly of the Defendant rendered a judgment dismissing the above appeal as the preliminary court No. 96-51.

[Ground of recognition] Each entry of Gap evidence Nos. 1, 5, and 6 (including paper numbers), and the purport of the whole pleading

2. Determination on the defense prior to the merits

A. The plaintiffs asserted that the above judgment against the plaintiff A of the defendant CEU and the general meeting of the defendant CEU had serious defects in the judgment of the court of first instance instead of the E-L council of the court of first instance, in violation of the jurisdiction of the court of first instance as set forth in the Constitution of the defendant's general meeting. The above judgment against the plaintiff B of the defendant CEU also was decided in the trial of the defendant CEU instead of the first instance court in violation of the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, and the plaintiff B had already been sentenced to the second six months prior to February 6, 2012 due to the unfair acquisition of roads, construction donation, and the unfair use of construction donation, but had already been sentenced to the second six months prior to the second six months prior to the second half of the defendant's general meeting, and sought nullification of each of the above judgments, asserting that there was a serious defect

As to this, each of the above judgments against the plaintiffs of the above defendants is not subject to judicial review, and thus, the above judgments are null and void.