1.The judgment of the first instance shall be modified as follows:

With respect to the real estate indicated in the attached list between the defendant and B.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows, and the reasoning of the judgment is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and such reasoning is cited pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The entry shall be made by inserting 1 to 5 of the judgment of the first instance court in part as follows.

Article 6(1)3 of the Credit Guarantee Agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and the Nonparty Company provides that “When there are grounds for a disposition of suspension of transaction by a clearing house in a company outside the country, B, who is a joint guarantor, shall bear the obligation of advance repayment for the amount guaranteed by the Plaintiff, even if there is no notification or peremptory notice from the Plaintiff.”

However, as seen earlier, the non-party company was subject to the disposition of suspension of transaction as of November 3, 2014, and thus, it should be deemed that the Plaintiff’s prior right to indemnity against B occurred on the same day.

However, in light of the fact that the date of concluding the instant sales contract was July 16, 2014; the date of completing the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the Defendant on the instant real estate on August 26, 2014; ① the occurrence of a credit guarantee accident as above when four months have not elapsed from each point of time; ② the Defendant also recognized the fact that the non-party company had already experienced financial difficulties at the time of the conclusion of the instant sales contract; ③ the details of payment made by the Plaintiff to the National Bank on behalf of the non-party company (Evidence A No. 7) include the unpaid interest from October 7, 2014, prior to the time of signing the instant sales contract, it is reasonable to deem that it was highly probable that the Plaintiff’s prior right to indemnity against B was established at the time of entering into the instant sales contract.

In light of the above legal principles, the Plaintiff’s prior right to claim reimbursement against B is the preserved claim for the obligee’s right to claim reimbursement regarding the instant sales contract.

The five pages 10 to 15 of the judgment of the first instance shall be stated as follows:

A according to each description of Eul's evidence Nos. 1 through 7.