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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2019.07.24 2019나8329
양수금
Text

1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff succeeding intervenor KRW 13,966,498 and KRW 8,626,207 among them.

Reasons

1. If a copy of the complaint, an original copy, etc. of the judgment were served by public notice as to the legitimacy of the appeal for subsequent completion, barring any special circumstance, the defendant was unaware of the service of the judgment without negligence, and in such a case, the defendant was unable to comply with the peremptory period due to a cause not attributable to him/her and thus, the appeal for subsequent completion may be filed within two weeks from the date such cause ceases

The "date on which the cause ceases to exist" refers to the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was rendered, and further the fact that the judgment was served by service by public notice is known.

In ordinary cases, only when a party or legal representative peruses the records of the case or receives a new original of the judgment, it shall be deemed that he/she became aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2004Da8005 Decided February 24, 2006. The judgment of the first instance was rendered after a copy of the complaint and the date of pleading, etc. were served by public notice, and the original copy of the judgment of the first instance was also served on the Defendant by public notice. The fact that the Defendant served a certified copy of the succeeding execution clause on November 27, 2018 and submitted the instant written appeal to the court of first instance on December 6, 2018 is apparent in the record.

According to the above facts, the defendant could not observe the appeal period due to the failure of the court of first instance to know that the judgment was delivered by public notice without negligence, and thus the defendant could not be responsible for such failure.

Since the court of first instance filed a subsequent appeal within two weeks from the time it became aware that the judgment was served by public notice, the appeal of this case is lawful.

2. Determination as to the claims of the Plaintiff’s succeeding intervenor

A. The defendant entered into a loan agreement with D Co., Ltd. on September 11, 2002 and received a loan from the above bank.

The defendant shall set the deadline on January 18, 2007.

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