1. The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiff, which orders payment below, shall be revoked.

The defendant.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following “the second order”, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420

2. On the other hand, the appeal Nos. 6, 9, and 11 of the first instance judgment is dismissed as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

B. The Defendant asserts that the limitation of liability is a mitigation of liability under Article 3(1) of the Act on the Liability for Fire Caused by Negligence (hereinafter “the Act”).

According to Articles 2 and 3(1) of the Fire Liability Act, in the event that the actual owner has no gross negligence, the claim for damages caused by burning may be claimed to reduce the amount of damages. In this case, the court may reduce the amount of damages in consideration of the circumstances under each subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the Fire Liability Act.

At this time, gross negligence refers to a situation in which, even without due care required for ordinary persons, it can easily be predicted that the result of harmful acts can be predicted, and even if the result of harmful acts can be predicted, it inevitably lacks significant attention, such as the intention, which is almost close to the intention.

(1) The Defendant’s liability is limited to 80%, taking into account the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant’s liability is limited to the Defendant’s liability, taking into account the following circumstances: (b) the Defendant’s occurrence of the instant fire cannot be deemed as having been grossly negligent; and (c) the Defendant’s occurrence of the instant fire was considerably damaged by the three parts of the factory building due to the instant fire.

Therefore, with respect to KRW 20,196,49 (=25,245,624) and KRW 12,622,812, which are the parts cited in the judgment of the first instance among them, it is reasonable to dispute the existence or scope of the Defendant’s obligation since February 3, 2015, which the Plaintiff sought after the date of payment of the Plaintiff’s insurance money.