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(영문) 광주고등법원 2017.08.18 2017나10311
매매대금
Text

1.The judgment of the first instance shall be modified as follows:

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff KRW 101,293,621 as well as to the plaintiff on March 2015.

Reasons

1. Grounds for this part of these facts are stated by the court of first instance.

In addition to the addition of Paragraph 4 below, since the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of the corresponding part of the judgment, it shall be quoted as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act. The plaintiff and the defendant have transacted under the instant secondary supply contract until the end of August 2014, and no further transaction has been made thereafter, and the instant secondary supply contract of this case terminated implicitly at that time (the defendant transferred D farm to G on November 24, 2014).

2. According to the facts of the above determination as to the cause of the claim, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of KRW 236,785,638 of the outstanding amount, etc. remaining after settling the payment arising under the second supply contract of this case (i.e., the outstanding amount of KRW 119,96,710,00,00 for original feed of KRW 311,243,50,000 for the total of KRW 311,61,670,00 for raising cost of KRW 137,00,00 for the raw material of KRW 311,243,50,00 for the remainder of the outstanding amount of KRW 429,516,242) and damages for delay.

3. Judgment on the defendant's assertion or defense

A. 1) The Defendant asserts that, after the husband’s death, E attempted to conclude a supply contract under his name after the husband’s net C (D farm operation) died, the Plaintiff demanded the Plaintiff to conclude a supply contract under the name of the Defendant, and accordingly, the Plaintiff prepared a supply contract under the name of the Defendant, but the actual operator of the D farm was E, and the Defendant was only lent the name as E, and the Plaintiff also concluded a supply contract under the well-known circumstances. Thus, the Plaintiff asserts that the party to the secondary supply contract of this case is not the Defendant but the “E”. However, if the actor who signed the contract did a legal act under the name of another person, the party to the secondary supply contract of this case is not the Defendant, but the party to the contract of this case.

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