logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2019.10.24 2018가단5277030
사용료
Text

1. The plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

On May 27, 2016, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant (Co., Ltd.) to lend equipment necessary for the construction of Saudidid Co., Ltd., and leased the equipment. The Defendant asserts that, on the other hand, the Plaintiff did not pay the equipment rental fee 402,744 interest rate.

In light of the following circumstances, which can be seen by comprehensively considering the overall purport of the pleadings in the evidence Nos. 2, 3, and 7 (including the number of branch numbers), the Defendant is established on March 26, 2014, and the branch offices of “C” as the party to the heavy equipment rental contract are established on February 13, 2013 and are prior to the establishment date of the Defendant, it is insufficient to recognize that the Defendant entered into a heavy equipment rental contract with the Plaintiff only with the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

Since D, who was substantially operating the defendant as to the claim of liability for Apparent representative director, concluded a mid-term equipment rental contract with the plaintiff using the name of the defendant's chairperson, the defendant asserts that the defendant bears the responsibility for Apparent representative director under Article 395 of the Commercial Act.

The liability of apparent representative director under Article 395 of the Commercial Act is acknowledged in cases where a person, other than the representative director of the company, performs a transaction by using a name that may be recognized as having the power of representation in appearance. The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that D used a name that can be recognized as having the authority of representation in the president, vice president, managing director, managing director, or any other company at the time when the Plaintiff entered into a contract for

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion based on this premise is without merit to examine further.

In conclusion, this conclusion is followed.

arrow