The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., imprisonment with prison labor and two years and six months) of the lower court’s sentencing is unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition to these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(2) The lower court’s judgment does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, and it is reasonable to respect the sentencing of the lower court on the grounds that, in light of the following: (a) the circumstance favorable to the sentencing asserted by the Defendant in the trial, including the fact that the Defendant, on the grounds stated in its reasoning of sentencing, was pronounced to the Defendant; (b) the Defendant, prior to the instant case, had been sentenced to a suspended sentence for a crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act; and (c) the Defendant, even before the instant case, had been sentenced to a suspended sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol; and (d) he/she again driven a motor vehicle while driving a motor vehicle on the sole condition that the blood alcohol content reaches 0.262%; and (c) there was no particular change in circumstances in the sentencing conditions in the trial; and thus, (d) the lower court’s judgment does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, it is true.