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(영문) 광주지방법원 2017.08.31 2017구단10596
자동차운전면허취소처분취소
Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of disposition;

A. On March 10, 2017, the Plaintiff, holding a Class 1 ordinary driver’s license, driven a F-car on the front of a restaurant located in C cafeteria B at netcheon City D, while under the influence of alcohol of 0.096% of blood alcohol level on March 10, 2017.

B. On April 10, 2017, the Defendant revoked the Plaintiff’s Class I ordinary driver’s license on the ground of the above drunk driving.

(hereinafter “instant disposition”). C.

The Plaintiff dissatisfied with the instant disposition and filed an administrative appeal on April 24, 2017, but the claim was dismissed on May 31, 2017.

[Ground of recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, Gap's 1 through 3, Eul's 8 through 10, and the purport of the whole pleading

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. In full view of the Plaintiff’s assertion of alcohol power and period, occupation, home circumstances, and circumstances leading to driving under the influence of alcohol, etc., the instant disposition is more unfavorable than the public interest to be gained due to the instant disposition, and thus, it is erroneous in the misapprehension of the discretionary authority.

(b) as shown in the attached Form of the relevant statutes;

C. According to the proviso of Article 93(1)2 of the Road Traffic Act, when a person who has driven at least twice without permission falls under the grounds for the suspension of a driver’s license by driving under the influence of alcohol again, the competent Commissioner of the Local Police Agency shall necessarily revoke the driver’s license. As such, such administrative disposition is binding without room for discretion.

However, according to the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 3 through 5, the plaintiff was found to have violated the Road Traffic Act twice by driving under the influence of alcohol 0.091% on June 1, 2003, and driving under the influence of alcohol 0.181% on December 27, 2003, and driving under the influence of alcohol 0.181% on December 27, 2003. Accordingly, the disposition of this case revoking the driver's license on the ground of the driving under the premise of such power is legitimate, and there is no possibility of abuse or deviation from discretionary power, and the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

3. The plaintiff's conclusion is that of this case.

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