1. The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows.

The plaintiff (appointed party)'s claim is dismissed.

2. The total cost of the lawsuit.

Basic Facts

This Court's reasoning is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this Court's reasoning is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

The plaintiffs' assertion as to the cause of the claim is that the defendant occupies and uses the instant 1 and 2 stores without legitimate source of right. Thus, the plaintiffs are co-ownership owners of each of the instant 1 and 2 stores and seek delivery based on the co-owner's act of preserving them.

Judgment

The co-owners of a majority share did not consult with the co-owners about the method of management of the jointly owned property in advance.

A majority of co-owners are entitled to independently decide matters concerning the management of the co-owned property, and therefore a majority of co-owners are entitled to exclusively use and benefit from one part of the co-owned property, but due to that, share is owned by them, but a minority right holder suffering from damages due to the failure to use and benefit from the specific part is entitled to unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent corresponding to the share.

As such, the obligation to return this portion is to be returned, but the possession by the third party who is permitted to use the specific portion again from the co-owners of the majority shares is a legitimate possession based on the right to manage jointly owned property by the majority right holders, so the third party cannot be deemed to have obtained the benefit without any legal ground due to the possession of the minority right holders.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2002Da9738 delivered on May 14, 2002). The second floor of D of this case, around 1995, all party walls that distinguish sectional ownership buildings while performing repair works after fire, have been removed, and the independence in the structure and use of sectional ownership buildings has been lost. Thus, it is reasonable to view that the second floor of D of this case was jointly owned by the existing sectional owners in proportion to the area of the previous section for exclusive use.

Under the following, the defendant is the second floor of the DNA Award.