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The judgment below
The part against the Defendants is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).
1. As to the grounds of appeal on the Defendants’ violation of the Act on the Assembly and Demonstration due to the Defendants’ special obstruction of performance of official duties, injury to public goods, and failure to comply with the dispersion order
A. Criminal facts have to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act). However, the cooking and probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact finding belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.
(Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act). For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the court below held that the court of first instance held that the Defendants shall be liable for the injury caused by special obstruction of performance of official duties and damage to public goods among the facts charged in the instant case as joint principal offenders, and rejected the grounds for appeal on mistake of facts and misapprehension of the legal principles.
The allegation in the grounds of appeal disputing such fact-finding by the lower court is merely an error of the lower court’s determination on the selection and probative value of evidence, which belongs to the free judgment of the fact-finding court.
In addition, examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the legal principles as to joint principal offenders and conspiracys as well as the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to joint principal offenders, the principle of trial on evidence, and the presumption of innocence, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical
B. In a case where it is deemed that the prosecutor significantly deviates from the discretionary power by arbitrarily exercising the authority to prosecute the defendant, the effect of the indictment may be denied by deeming it as abuse of the authority to prosecute.
Supreme Court Decision 2004No. 27 delivered on April 27, 2004