1. The plaintiff's appeal is all dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are borne by the representative of the Plaintiff’s J.

purport, purport, and.

1. The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as follows, except for adding the following judgments as to the matters asserted by the plaintiff in the trial, and therefore, it is identical to the part of the reasoning for the judgment in the first instance. Therefore, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the

[Supplementary Judgment]

A. The Plaintiff asserts that at the ordinary meeting of November 11, 2013 (No. 10. 9) the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit and confirmed that he/she is the representative of the Plaintiff.

In this regard, the defendant asserts that the above J does not have any interest in the plaintiff's representative, who is the convocation of the above general meeting, and that all the convocation and resolution of the above general meeting by the above J are null and void.

B. (1) Determination does not have any reason to exclude women in determining whether a person has the right to convene a clan assembly held to appoint a representative of the relevant legal doctrine, and thus, a person, including women, who is the highest and the highest age among the entire members of the clans including women, shall be the co-inheritors.

However, it is sufficient to identify whether a member of a family council has a right to call a clan general meeting within the extent possible to contact by ascertaining whether he/she is alive or contact information by a method recognized by social norms, as it is deemed possible to contact, even though he/she has formally and objectively determined by data, such as a family report, but the life or death of a member of the family council determined accordingly is unknown or not.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2009Da26596 Decided December 9, 2010). In order to take effect the resolution of a clan general meeting for the appointment of a clan representative, the general meeting is required to have been convened by a legitimate convening authority. Thus, if the general meeting is not convened by a legitimate convening authority, the resolution for the appointment of a representative at the above general meeting is not effective (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da34124, Nov. 27, 1992). Even if it is called by an unqualified convening authority, the convening authority shall not convene the general meeting.