All of the appeals by prosecutors are dismissed.

I. Summary of the grounds for appeal

1. The lower court found Defendant A not guilty of each of the facts charged (defendant A) of the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Misappropriation) (hereinafter “Violation of the Aggravated Punishment, etc.”) related to the lending of trademark rights to G (hereinafter “G”) (hereinafter “Violation of the Aggravated Punishment, etc.”) (hereinafter “H”) to have Defendant A use the Plaintiff’s trademark right at a fee of KRW 10 million or free, contrary to the interests of G, constitutes an act of breach of trust against G. However, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the intention of a violation of the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Misappropriation).

2. The lower court acquitted Defendant A of each charge of violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act (Misappropriation) with respect to the lending of KRW 1.8 billion to G funds and the endorsement of promissory notes (a breach of trust) on each charge of violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act (Defendant A) (hereinafter “Defendant A”), while lending KRW 1.8 billion to H or endorsement to H on a promissory note issued by H constitutes an act of breach of trust against G, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the intent of a violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act (Misappropriation of Trust)

3. The facts charged of occupational breach of trust following the transfer of the right to use G trademark rights (Defendant A) (hereinafter “Defendant A”) established M by ordering L to establish M and operated by using G’s trademark rights. Therefore, the Defendant’s act of allowing M to use the overseas trademark royalties in 2006 can be deemed as the Defendant’s act. However, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on intent of occupational breach of trust and thereby acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged.

4. The facts charged of occupational embezzlement (defendants) that Defendant A used G funds for the purpose of supporting and donating political persons, sports organizations, etc. are only aimed at improving the status of Defendant A, and in particular, donated support funds, etc. in the name of an individual of the above Defendant, not “G” and thus, it can be deemed as embezzlement of G. However, the lower court did not err in its judgment.