The part concerning the crime of No. 4 of the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court of second instance are reversed.

Defendant 1.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., the form of punishment) of the lower court (e., one year of imprisonment with prison labor for crimes Nos. 1 through 3 as indicated in the judgment of the lower court; four months of imprisonment with prison labor for crimes No. 4 as indicated in the judgment of the lower court; six months of imprisonment with prison labor

2. Ex officio determination (the part concerning the crime No. 4 in the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court of second instance as to the ground for appeal) shall be examined ex officio prior to the judgment

In the first instance trial, each appeal case against the judgment of the court below was combined, and each of the crimes in the judgment of the court of first instance as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance is concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and thus, one sentence shall be imposed pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act. As such, the part concerning the crime No. 4 of the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the

3. The Korean Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle on the argument of unfair sentencing (as to the crimes of No. 1 through No. 3 in the judgment of the court of first instance), exists in the area inherent in the first instance as to the determination of sentencing, and in addition, in light of the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the judgment of the court of first instance, and the sentencing of the court of first instance is not beyond the reasonable scope of the discretion, and it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the court of first instance for the reason that the sentence of the court of first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion,

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In accordance with the foregoing legal doctrine, no special change in sentencing conditions exists in comparison with the lower court’s judgment, and the Defendant was found to have been sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment with labor by forging another’s signature when he/she was discovered while driving a drinking or non-driving license, and six times for a drunk driving.