1. Of the principal lawsuit of this case, the lawsuit against Defendant E and the counterclaim of this case shall be dismissed, respectively.

2. The defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff).

1. Facts of recognition;

A. On August 22, 2016, Defendant E purchased at KRW 1,350,000,000, and paid KRW 130,000,000 for down payment to Nonparty G and two other persons, the Plaintiff purchased from Nonparty G and Nonparty G, and KRW 130,00,000 for two parcels (hereinafter “each of the instant real property”).

(hereinafter referred to as the “instant sales contract”) B.

I Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “instant corporation”) was established on September 2, 2016 with Plaintiff B as the representative director, Plaintiff B as the director, and Defendant E as the auditor.

C. On November 22, 2016, the Plaintiffs issued a promissory note with a face value of KRW 530,000,000 at face value, Defendant D and due date, April 30, 2017, and attached it to the instant notarial deed.

Defendant E paid the intermediate payment of KRW 200,000,000 according to the instant sales contract to two other persons than G on November 23, 2016.

E. On June 2, 2017, Defendant E, upon the rescission of the instant sales contract with Nonparty G and two other parties, returned KRW 330,000,000 (= KRW 130,000,000) out of KRW 230,000,000, which was already paid from Nonparty and two other parties (i.e., KRW 200,000), and received payment around that time.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 3 and 7, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. We examine the legality of each of the above lawsuits ex officio to determine the lawsuits against Defendant E and the counterclaim of this case among the principal lawsuits of this case.

A. Among the principal lawsuit of this case, the lawsuit of demurrer against the legitimacy of the lawsuit against Defendant E is a lawsuit seeking the exclusion of the executory power, on the ground of an objection raised against the claim indicated in the executory power, and thus, the person indicated as a creditor in the executory power or his successor, or other persons entitled to apply for compulsory execution with the executory power, shall have the standing to be the defendant.

However, as seen earlier, the obligee of the notarial deed of this case is Defendant D’s fact, and otherwise, Defendant E constitutes a person who is entitled to file an application for compulsory execution according to Defendant D’s successor or other executive titles.