1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff corresponding to the money ordered to be paid additionally shall be revoked.

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation on this part of the facts of recognition is that “this court” is dismissed as “the first instance court,” and that “A defendant delivered the instant store to the Plaintiff on August 6, 2014,” in addition to adding “a defendant delivered the instant store to the Plaintiff on August 6, 2014,” it is identical with the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance as stated in Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act. Thus, this part is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420

2. The judgment of this Court

A. According to the above recognition of possession from August 23, 2012 to August 31, 2013, the Plaintiff agreed to use the instant store free of charge to C and the Defendant on the condition that the partnership business with the attached C is maintained.

However, on August 22, 2012, the relationship between the Defendant and C was terminated by dismissing C from a brokerage assistant, and thus, the loan for use of the instant store was terminated between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

I would like to say.

Therefore, the Defendant, barring special circumstances, occupied and used the instant store from August 23, 2012 to August 31, 2013, thereby gaining profit equivalent to the profits from use, and thereby causing damages equivalent to the same amount to the Plaintiff, the owner of the instant store.

As such, the Plaintiff is obligated to return this as unjust enrichment.

The defendant asserts that the store of this case is originally owned by C, and that the registration under the name of the plaintiff is null and void pursuant to the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder's Name, and therefore, the defendant cannot file a claim for return of unjust enrichment on the premise that this registration is valid.

However, as seen earlier, since the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer for 1/2 shares of the real estate listed in the separate sheet on October 24, 2011, the Plaintiff is presumed to be a legitimate owner for 1/2 shares of the instant store, and the Plaintiff is merely a title trustee of C.