All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Examining the reasoning of Defendant C’s appeal in light of the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court, which maintained the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court was justifiable to have found Defendant C guilty of all the charges of this case on the grounds stated in its reasoning. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of Article 14(1)4 of the Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse and Article 15(1)2 of the same Act, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of Article 14(1)2 of the same Act and Article 15(1)2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles from Sexual Abuse, or by misapprehending the principle on the prohibition of double punishment, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the crime of aiding and abetting a joint principal.

In addition, pursuant to Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without prison labor for more than ten years has been imposed, a final appeal may be filed on the grounds of unfair sentencing. As such, in this case where Defendant C was sentenced to a minor punishment, the argument that the amount of punishment is unfair is not legitimate grounds for final appeal

2. Examining the grounds for appeal by Defendant F, G, and H in light of the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court, which maintained the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court, based on its reasoning, found Defendant F, G, and H guilty guilty of all of the facts charged in the instant case against Defendant F, G, and H, and of violation of the Act on the Protection of Children from Sexual Abuse (i.e., brokerage) and the Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (ii., coercion), based on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, is justifiable to maintain the first instance judgment that sentenced Defendant G, and H to a regular sentence, which had already been attained at the time of the pronouncement of the first instance judgment. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court erred by misapprehending the logical and empirical rules and exceeding the bounds of free conviction and by exceeding