The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The misapprehension of the legal principle is not a road under the Road Traffic Act, but only repeats the vehicle, which is located in the field at the time, and thus, it does not constitute driving under the Road Traffic Act.

Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine, which found the Defendant guilty of the facts charged.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (ten months of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution) is more severe.

2. Determination

A. 1) Determination of the misapprehension of the legal principle as to the assertion of Article 148-2 of the Road Traffic Act is punishing the "person who drives a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol". Meanwhile, Article 2-2 of the Road Traffic Act defines "driving" as using a motor vehicle or horse in accordance with its original usage method, but it includes "other areas than the road" in Articles 44 and 148-2 of the same Act. Thus, regardless of whether the place where the defendant driven a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol constitutes "road" under Article 2-1 of the Road Traffic Act, it is clear that the "driving" under the Road Traffic Act is subject to punishment under Article 148-2 of the Road Traffic Act, regardless of whether the place where the defendant driven the motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol constitutes "road" under Article 2-2 of the Road Traffic Act (Article 2-26 of the Road Traffic Act), and it is necessary to complete the operation of the motor vehicle with the intention to drive the motor vehicle in accordance with its original usage method.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da30834, Nov. 12, 1999). It is recognized that the Defendant repeatedly transferred and repaired his/her own motor vehicle. As such, if the Defendant had moved by walking a motor vehicle on the part of his/her own, he/she is using the motor vehicle in accordance with its original method of use, even if it was for the purpose of cutting off the motor vehicle, and constitutes “driving” under the Road Traffic Act.

3. Therefore, the defendant's assertion of legal principles is without merit.

(b).