1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of this court’s judgment citing the judgment of the court of first instance is identical to the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for amendments as set forth below, and thus, citing it as it is in accordance with the main sentence of

[Revision] Part 3 of the judgment of the court of first instance inserting "First," and then inserting "as seen below."

Part 3 of the judgment of the first instance shall be amended by the following: "A person may be recognized, and "a person may be recognized," from Part 12 to 19:

According to the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 2 (including additional numbers) and evidence of the first instance court E and I, Eul established L through E, and Eul additionally invested KRW 150,00,000 in the above company with personal guarantee of Eul around December 31, 199, and additionally invested KRW 150,000 in the above company. Ultimately, it demanded Eul to compensate for the loss of the investment fund due to the failure of the above business, and it received the establishment of the instant right to collateral in Eul's apartment name as above, and I transferred the instant right to collateral with the above secured claim and completed additional registration before the right to collateral. Since the secured claim of the instant right to collateral of this case did not have a fixed period of time for payment, it is clear that the extinctive prescription period from the point of time to June 10, 200 to the above-mentioned apartment contract has been expired at the latest.

In this regard, the defendant's defense that E, a debtor, has suspended prescription or waived the benefit of extinctive prescription.

In full view of the statements in subparagraph 5-1 and the testimony of witness E of the first instance court, E may recognize the fact that E has waived the benefit of extinctive prescription on January 25, 2017 during the extinctive prescription period, and the Plaintiff is merely a general creditor of E and does not directly receive any benefit due to the extinction of the secured claim.