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(영문) 서울남부지방법원 2018.09.19 2018가단228251
청구이의
Text

1. The defendant's compulsory execution against the plaintiff is denied based on the payment order of Seoul Southern District Court 2007 tea8192.

Reasons

1. Determination on the cause of the claim

A. Basic facts (1) On May 7, 2007, the Defendant applied for a payment order against the Plaintiff to the Seoul Southern District Court 2007 tea8192 and received the payment order (hereinafter “instant payment order”) stating that “the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant KRW 45 million and the amount equivalent to 20% per annum from the day following the service date of the original copy of the above payment order to the day of complete payment.” The above payment order was finalized on May 26, 2007.

(2) On April 30, 2018, the Defendant, based on the instant payment order finalized, filed an application for a seizure and collection order against each of the deposit claims owned by the Plaintiff against the third debtor by designating the debtor and the third debtor as six banks, including the National Bank, etc., as Seoul Southern District Court 2018 TaT6153. On May 23, 2018, the Defendant received a seizure and collection order from the said court.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 3, Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

B. According to the facts acknowledged as above, the Defendant’s loan claims against the Plaintiff were extinguished after the lapse of the extinctive prescription on May 26, 2017, when ten years from May 26, 2007 when the instant payment order became final and conclusive.

Unless there are special circumstances, compulsory execution based on the payment order of this case should be rejected.

2. As to the Defendant’s assertion and judgment, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff’s address was ex officio from October 1, 2008 to December 30, 201, and accordingly, the Defendant’s compulsory execution during the pertinent period was practically impossible, and that the period should be suspended or suspended during the said period.

However, the defendant's assertion does not fall under the grounds for the interruption of prescription or the grounds for the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act, and the plaintiff's address is ex officio.

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