1. The Seoul Western District Court Decision 2015Hu48763 against the Plaintiff by the Defendant and the Defendant succeeding Intervenor.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The Defendant filed an application against the Plaintiff for a payment order of takeover money with Seoul Western District Court Decision 2015Hu48763, Aug. 12, 2015, the Defendant issued a payment order to the Plaintiff that “the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant 2,69,453 won and 593,356 won per annum from the day following the day when the original copy of the instant payment order was served to the day of complete payment, and the payment order became final and conclusive around that time.”

(hereinafter “instant payment order”). B.

On December 23, 2015, when the lawsuit of this case was pending, the Defendant’s succeeding intervenor acquired the claim based on the payment order of this case from the Defendant, and notified the Plaintiff of the transfer on February 29, 2016 and delivered the notification around that time.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 4, Eul evidence 2 and 4 (including branch numbers, if any; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. According to the above facts of recognition, since the defendant transferred his claim based on the payment order of this case to the defendant succeeding intervenor, compulsory execution against the plaintiff shall be dismissed.

In addition, a credit card payment claim based on the payment order of this case between the Plaintiff and U.S.S. Co., Ltd. is deemed to have been due and due before July 1, 2004, which was the first credit transfer date. It is clear in the record that the Defendant’s application for the payment order of this case was received to the court after five years from the date of the first credit transfer. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the above claim had already

As to this, the Defendant’s succeeding intervenor argued to the effect that the Plaintiff had expressed an agreed intent before the execution of the seizure of corporeal movables, and that the period during which to claim extinctive prescription has elapsed by filing a lawsuit of this case after the execution of the seizure of corporeal movables (the Defendant’s assertion was invoked). However, the said circumstance alone alone did not complete extinctive prescription or the Plaintiff had already completed