1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of this court citing the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following cases: (a) No. 5 of the judgment of the court of first instance, 13-18 of the judgment, and thus, (b) pursuant to the main sentence of Article

2. The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the Defendant is implementing a blacking system (in the event that an insurance solicitor first terminates a commissioning contract with the Defendant, if the insurance solicitor concludes a commissioning contract with the Defendant’s corporate agent and requests the Defendant through the corporate agent to file an application for registration of insurance solicitors with the Life Insurance Association. Although there are no special circumstances such as grounds for disqualification under the relevant provisions of the Insurance Business Act, it is not acceptable to recognize that the Defendant is implementing an application for registration of the insurance solicitor itself with the Life Insurance Association, even though there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

In addition, the defendant is not due to the Blosting system, but because the plaintiff has damaged trust by inducing conflicts in the workplace while he is commissioned as an insurance solicitor belonging to the defendant, it is argued that he refused to apply for registration of the plaintiff.

The evidence submitted by the defendant alone is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff has caused serious conflicts between other insurance solicitors and the heads of branches by excessively interfering with the operation of the branch or demanding special treatment compared to other insurance solicitors due to their own ability, as shown by the defendant's assertion. However, in full view of the above evidence, the plaintiff requested the defendant to terminate the commissioning contract with the plaintiff from February 2, 2015, and it can be acknowledged that the defendant suspended the soliciting business without his attendance from March 2015, because it can be acknowledged that the defendant had suspended the soliciting business without his attendance from March 2015.