1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows: "The part corresponding to 15-20 meters wide to south of the real estate of this case, and the part corresponding to 8-10 meters wide to that south is in conflict with each urban planning road" of 2, 16, and 17 of the judgment of the court of first instance, stating that "the real estate of this case conflicts with each urban planning road of 2:2 m (breadth 15-20m) south of the real estate of this case and 8-10m wide to that south, and the two breadth (breadth 8-10m wide) narrow to that south, except for adding additional judgment of the court of first instance as described in paragraph (2), it is identical to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and therefore, it is cited in accordance with the main sentence of

2. Additional determination of the trial;

A. The Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff purchased the pertinent real estate after being incorporated into the road among the instant real estate and having remaining parts of the said real estate, with the knowledge of its investment value. Since such motive was caused by the Defendant’s side, the instant sales contract was revoked on the grounds of motive mistake.

B. In order to cancel a juristic act on the ground that the mistake in the motive of judgment falls under an error in an important part of the contents of the juristic act, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the motive was the content of the declaration of intention in question and that it is the content of the juristic act in the interpretation of the declaration of intention, and it is not necessary to reach an agreement to separately consider the motive as the content of the juristic act between the parties as the content of the declaration of intention. However, the error in the contents of the juristic act should be an important part to the extent that it would have been deemed that if the general public

(See Supreme Court Decision 97Da44737 delivered on February 10, 1998, etc.). In full view of the following: (a) Evidence Nos. 2-1, 7, 2-2, 5-1 through 3-3, witness D of the first instance trial, and witness C’s testimony, the Plaintiff’s real estate of this case as an urban planning road at the time of entering into the sales contract of this case.