1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning for the court's explanation of this case is as follows, except for the addition of "the next 2. Additional Judgment" as to the plaintiff's additional arguments in this court, and therefore, it is identical to the ground for the judgment in the first instance. Thus, it shall be cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of

2. Additional determination

A. The Plaintiffs asserts that “the instant service contract is not a delegation contract, a non-titled contract similar thereto, or a contract under a condition precedent, but a contract is deemed not a delegation contract, or a contract under a condition precedent, and in such case, the instant service contract cannot be terminated at any time pursuant to Article 689(1) of the Civil Act, and the contract can only be terminated in accordance with the general doctrine of termination of the contract. However, the instant service contract’s automatic termination clause (Article 6(6)) is merely an entry of right of rescission and cannot be viewed as a contract termination as a matter of course without any peremptory

However, even if the contract of this case is deemed to be the contract of this case, it appears that the termination of the contract of this case by the defendant is based on the automatic termination clause (Article 6 (6)) of the contract of this case, and it is difficult to see that the peremptory notice is separately required for the termination of the contract of this case in the interpretation of the above automatic termination clause. As stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, the contract of this case was automatically terminated in accordance with Article 6 (6) of the contract of this case.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

B. The Plaintiffs asserts that “The implied agreement to partially modify the instant contract was concluded on or around December 1, 2017 regarding Article 3(2)1 and Article 6 subparag. 6 of the instant service contract, so the Defendant cannot terminate the contract on the grounds of the foregoing provision.”

The descriptions of Gap evidence No. 4-1, Gap evidence No. 12-4 are insufficient to recognize it, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Therefore, the plaintiffs are above.