1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited in this case is as follows: (a) the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited in this case is as follows: (b) the “4.6 of April 2014” in the 14th part of the judgment of the court of first instance as “4.8 of April 2014”; and (c) the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance

2. In full view of the evidence adopted by the first instance court in its supplementary judgment and the following circumstances acknowledged according to the witness G’s partial testimony, the evidence submitted alone is insufficient to recognize that the registration of ownership preservation in this case is null and void, and there is no other evidence.

The change of the name of the owner and the new building permit after the lapse is an administrative disposition that the administrative agency only recovers the freedom to permit the completion of a certain construction activity and does not grant any new rights or ability, but does not acquire the ownership of the building by the person stated in the building permit.

(See Supreme Court Decision 96Da10638 delivered on March 28, 1997). However, around July 11, 2007, the Plaintiff appears to have changed the owner’s name as to the instant building to C in order to repay the debt to himself/herself or national human resources C.

In addition, C seems to have completed the remaining construction after the change in the name of the owner.

(A) In the end, it is natural to view that C acquires the ownership of the building of this case in the process of new construction and completes the remainder of the construction after taking over the name of the owner.

B. Since it is difficult to deem that a written consent to change the name of the owner was forged, there is no dispute between the parties that the stamp image attached to the Plaintiff’s name of the owner is based on the Plaintiff’s seal imprint, it shall be presumed that the written consent to change the name of the owner was genuine in accordance with Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Act.

The plaintiff raises a defense that "this is forged by G, etc. which was a C representative director."

. The above.