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1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
Purport of claim and appeal
1...
Reasons
1. The court of first instance rejected the Plaintiff’s claim for the payment of accrued construction costs and the claim for additional construction costs regarding the unpaid construction costs under the construction contract dated May 23, 2015 and the additional contract concluded on August 22, 2015 against the Defendant, and only the Defendant appealed. Accordingly, the subject of the judgment of this court is limited to the claim for the payment of unpaid construction costs as above.
2. The reasoning of the judgment that the court should explain this part of the facts of recognition is as stated in Paragraph 1 of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except where the "construction cost" under Section 14 of the judgment of the court of first instance is deemed to be "construction cost", and therefore, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420
3. Determination
A. The reasoning for this Court’s judgment is as stated in Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, inasmuch as the reasoning for the judgment of the first instance is as stated in Article 2(a) of the reasoning of the judgment, except for the addition of judgment as follows.
B. In addition to the determination, the Defendant asserts that even if the Plaintiff did not agree on the compensation for delay under the instant construction contract and the instant additional contract, the Plaintiff shall pay the compensation for delay in accordance with ordinary practices, and that the Plaintiff sustained damages due to delay in the completion of the construction work, so the orderer, in the absence of an agreement on compensation for delay, shall not be deemed to have an agreement on compensation for delay and shall not seek the payment of compensation for delay, regardless of the fact that the contractor may assert the specific amount of damages incurred due to delay in the construction work against the contractor, and shall not be deemed to have an agreement on compensation for delay (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da590, Mar. 29, 2012). Thus, as alleged by the Defendant, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have an obligation to pay the compensation for delay in accordance with ordinary practices, and further, the Plaintiff’s statement in subparagraph 4 alone is made on December 30, 2015.