1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. Quotation of the first instance judgment

A. The Plaintiff’s grounds for appeal do not differ significantly from the allegations in the first instance court, except for adding or emphasizing the following claims, and even if each evidence submitted to the first instance court was presented to this court, the instant land cannot be deemed as an administrative property as “railroad site” and cannot be deemed as an object of prescriptive acquisition. At least, the Plaintiff’s fact-finding and determination by the first instance court, which did not accept the Plaintiff’s assertion on the completion of prescriptive acquisition, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s disuse was not achieved from October 20, 1972 to December 13, 2012.

B. Therefore, this court's judgment is based on the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance except for adding the following judgments to "the first instance court" as "the second instance court", and thus, it is consistent with the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance. Thus, this court's judgment is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Additional determination

A. The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that the instant land constitutes an object of prescriptive acquisition, as the Incheon Station was closed on November 1, 1973, and since the remainder of the E section was completely suspended on December 31, 1995, the instant land has no value as administrative property, and thus, it constitutes an object of prescriptive acquisition.

However, the mere fact that the expression of intention of public abolition is not only an express expression of intention, but also an implied expression of intention, but also an implied expression of intention, and that the administrative property is in a state where it is not provided for its original purpose cannot be deemed that there was an expression of intention of public abolition by the office of administration. The burden of proving that the administrative property is removed for public use and is subject to prescriptive acquisition exists in the person who asserts prescriptive acquisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da49548, Jan. 15, 199). The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is the abolition of the public use of the instant land.