1. The plaintiff's respective claims against the defendants are all dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. The Plaintiff completed the registration of preservation of ownership on May 27, 1970, under the receipt No. 2837 on May 27, 1970, with respect to F forest land 27,669 square meters (hereinafter “F land before the division”).

Defendant B and C completed the combination registration of F land under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (amended by Act No. 3094 of Dec. 31, 197 and enforced on March 1, 1978, hereinafter “former Special Measures for the Transfer of Ownership”), which was due to sale on June 17, 1980, No. 11234, May 1, 1974 (hereinafter “instant combination registration”).

The F land before subdivision was divided into each real estate listed in the separate sheet on February 24, 2006 (hereinafter “each land of this case”), and the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 was divided into “F land after subdivision.”

As to each of the instant lands, the Defendant Public Credit Union (hereinafter “Defendant Union”) completed the registration of creation of superficies as follows: (a) No. 3932, Feb. 27, 2009; (b) No. 455,00,000 won with respect to each of the instant lands; (c) the registration of creation of a mortgage on February 27, 2009; (d) the registration of creation of a mortgage on February 27, 2009; (b) the registration of creation of a mortgage on February 27, 2009; (e) the registration of creation of a mortgage on February 393, 209; (e) the ownership of a building or other structure; (f) the entire duration of the relevant land; (f) the ownership of a superficies; (f) the entire duration of the land; and (f) the registration of creation of a mortgage on December 21, 2010; (f) the registration of creation of a mortgage on December 50, 2010

(2) The lower court determined that the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of a right to collateral security and superficies on July 8, 2014, and did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the establishment of a right to collateral security and superficies on July 8, 2014, as otherwise alleged in the ground of the lower court’s judgment.