1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal, including the part arising from the supplementary participation, are all assessed against the Plaintiff.

1. While the Plaintiff cited the judgment of the court of first instance, the first instance has repeatedly asserted the content that was alleged as a ground for illegality in the judgment of first instance.

The grounds for this court's assertion are as follows, except for supplement of judgment as to whether the plaintiff's place of work is specially limited under a labor contract, the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance.

Therefore, it is accepted in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

[Supplementary judgment] The plaintiff asserts that the transfer disposition of this case without the plaintiff's consent is null and void, since he/she specially limited the place of service to B while entering into an employment contract with the intervenor.

Where the content of a contract is prepared in writing between the parties to the contract, which is a disposal document, if the objective meaning of the text is clear, the existence and content of the expression of intent shall be recognized, unless there are special circumstances.

However, if the objective meaning of the language is not clearly revealed, the contents of the language and text, regardless of the party’s internal intent, and the motive and background leading up to the conclusion of the contract, the purpose and genuine intent to be achieved by the party concerned, transaction practices, etc. shall be comprehensively considered, and the contents of the contract between the parties shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules, social common common common sense, and transaction norms so as to be consistent with the concept of social justice and equity.

(2) According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited earlier (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Da14115, Jun. 26, 2014). According to the facts acknowledged by the court of first instance, the Plaintiff and the Intervenor entered the Plaintiff’s workplace as “B” on March 7, 1999, and the Plaintiff worked in B from March 7, 199 to August 14, 2012.