The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The judgment of the court below which acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged in this case, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles, even though the Defendant intentionally operated and driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

2. Determination

A. On June 26, 2014, the Defendant: (a) around 05:30, the summary of the facts charged, while under the influence of alcohol of 0.136% on the street in the 8 New Capital Don-ro, Taedok-ro, YW car, approximately 50cm.

B. The judgment of the court below 1) The defendant acknowledged that he had drinking while drinking alcohol at the time. However, he only worked in a rest with a driver's seat, etc. and did not drive a motor vehicle.

The argument is asserted.

2) Article 148-2 of the Road Traffic Act provides that a person who drives a motor vehicle, etc. under the influence of alcohol shall be punished, and Article 2-26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that "driving means using the horse (including operation) on the road (including places other than the road in cases falling under Articles 44, 45, 54-1, 148 and 148-2) according to its original purpose and use.

The concept of driving referred to in this article includes a purpose element in light of the content of the provision, so it means only intentional driving act, and it does not fall under driving in the case of driving a motor vehicle without any intention or involvement of a person in the motor vehicle.

In order for a person to drive a motor vehicle for other purposes without the intention of having the motor vehicle move, it does not fall under the driving of the motor vehicle in a case where the motor vehicle gets on the move or gets on the move of the motor vehicle due to the power of driving the motor by building the devices necessary for the launch of the motor, such as the defraying machine, etc., according to the driving force of the motor (see Supreme Court Decisions 2005Do6563, Nov. 10, 2005; 2004Do1109, Apr. 23, 2004).