1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The Defendant’s dismissal against the Plaintiff on March 2, 2016, of the position of the Director C.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance citing this case is as follows, and this case is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, since the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance citing this case is the same as that of the court of

The 2nd, 9, 10th of the first instance judgment shall be followed as follows.

B. AD organization recommended the Plaintiff as the chief knowledge of C on August 11, 2014, pursuant to Article 61 of the Defendant’s Constitutional Court Order, and the Defendant appointed the Plaintiff as the chief knowledge of C on January 12, 2015, the Defendant added “Evidence Nos. 46 through 48” to the 2nd 17th 17th 1 of the judgment of the first instance.

The 11th to 5th shall be followed by the following:

(c) As to the Defendant’s claim that E is not a creative owner (the chief secretary of the inspection, the registration of which has been completed due to the contribution act (including any unregistered inspection) shall be appointed by the president on the recommendation of the founder and his successor: Provided, That the chief secretary and the representative officer of F shall, on the recommendation of the owner, recommend that the chief secretary be appointed by the recommendation of the owner), and Article 62(1) (the chief director or representative officer shall recommend that the chief director be appointed by the recommendation of the owner within 15 days if he is dismissed due to disciplinary action or other causes. However, according to the provisions of the preceding Article, if the chief director or representative officer is not recommended by the date without justifiable grounds, the chief director of the relevant branch office shall recommend the chief secretary or to request his dismissal, that is, the right to recommend and dismiss the chief secretary, and that the chief director shall be the chief director of the relevant branch office.

However, according to the overall purport of evidence Nos. 11, 36, and 44 as well as the overall purport of the pleadings, the following: (a) D organization, the original owner of C, entered into a transfer contract, such as the status and authority, with the purport of transferring the status of C, to E on February 5, 2012; and (b) E, around March 2015, filed an application for change of the original owner to E with the Defendant for change of C, and the Defendant accepted the application for change of the original owner on March 24, 2015.