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1. The judgment of the first instance court is modified as follows. A.
Among the lawsuits of this case, active damages are the primary and primary.
Reasons
1. The reasons for this part of the facts of recognition are as follows: (a) except where the “Defendant F” is deemed to be a “Defendant AO”, the corresponding part of the judgment of the first instance is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment; and (b) this is cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of
2. The defendants' defense of principal safety
A. The key point of the instant safety defense agreed with the Defendants that the Plaintiffs did not file a lawsuit for damages due to each of the instant assault acts through the agreement with the Defendants.
Therefore, the instant lawsuit is an unlawful lawsuit filed in violation of the Collegiate Agreement.
B. As to the tort damages, if the tortfeasor and the victim received a certain amount of money and renounced the remainder of the claim, or the agreement to waive the right to not file a civil or criminal lawsuit or objection against the perpetrator or the so-called non-prosecution agreement was reached, the damage was thereafter caused.
Therefore, even though it is impossible to claim compensation again, it is difficult to accurately confirm the scope of the damage because the agreement has not yet elapsed after the accident, which is the cause of the occurrence of the damage, and it is difficult to predict the extent of the damage in light of the circumstances at the time of the agreement, and it is reasonable to view that if the parties anticipated the damage after the occurrence of the accident, the amount of the agreement would not have reached a settlement under the generally accepted social norms if the parties anticipated the damage after the occurrence of the accident, the intent of the parties concerned cannot be deemed to have waived
(See Supreme Court Decision 97Da423, Apr. 11, 1997, etc.). The Plaintiff A was diagnosed by Red Calveymitis, etc. around Jan. 20, 2012, and received approximately three weeks stroke treatment. Around Jan. 27, 2012, the Plaintiff continued to undergo the diagnosis of stress disorder after external wound, and depression.