1. The plaintiff's appeal is all dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation as to the legitimacy of the basic facts and the claim portion against Defendant C Union is as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance and in the part on the claim against Defendant C Union, and therefore, it is identical to that of the part on the “1. Basic Facts” and “2. Claim against the Defendant Union.” As such, it

2. Determination as to the claim against Defendant B

A. Defendant B Co., Ltd.’s assertion on the following grounds: (a) arbitrarily terminates the instant automobile rental contract even though there was no violation of the Plaintiff’s contract; and (b) by recovering and reducing the said vehicle, is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages and refund the deposit amount equivalent to KRW 35,000.

① The Plaintiff operated the instant vehicle as a traffic-related vehicle free of charge only to the substitute driver belonging to the company, and this does not constitute a commercial transport.

② In concluding a long-term lease contract with Defendant B, the Plaintiff notified the above Defendant M that the instant vehicle will be used for traffic of a substitute driver, so Defendant B Co., Ltd., while being aware of the purpose of use of the instant vehicle.

Therefore, the termination of the instant car rental contract by Defendant B on the ground of the Plaintiff’s commercial transport is contrary to the good faith principle.

B. Determination 1) As to whether the Plaintiff used the instant vehicle for transport with compensation (Article 34 of the Passenger Transport Act does not stipulate whether it has been used for transport by many unspecified persons), and the fact that the Plaintiff entered into a contract for substitute driving with a substitute driver under his/her control and entered into a contract for substitute driving with a substitute driver under his/her control, stating that “the traffic business” in the contract is a principle of free driving.

However, on the other hand, Gap's evidence Nos. 4, 7 (including paper numbers), Eul's evidence Nos. 3 and 4, and the testimony and whole pleadings of the witness of the trial court.