1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Whether a subsequent appeal is lawful;

A. If a copy, original copy, etc. of a complaint was served by service by public notice, barring special circumstances, the defendant was unaware of the service of the judgment without negligence. In such a case, the defendant is unable to comply with the peremptory period due to a cause not attributable to him/her, and thus, he/she is entitled to file an appeal for subsequent appeal within two weeks from the date such cause ceases to exist.

In addition, the term “the date on which a cause ceases to exist” refers to the time when a party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was delivered by public notice, rather than the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was delivered by public notice. Thus, barring any special circumstance, it shall be deemed that the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice only when the party or legal representative inspected the

B. (See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da8005, Feb. 24, 2006).

In the instant case, the court of first instance rendered a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on November 4, 2013 after serving a duplicate of the complaint against the Defendant and the notice of the date of pleading by public notice, and subsequently proceeding with pleadings. The original of the judgment was also served on the Defendant by public notice. The Defendant, on October 10, 2014, inspected the records of the first instance trial on October 10, 2014, and filed an appeal for subsequent completion on October 10, 2014, prior to the lapse of two weeks thereafter, may be recognized by means of significant or overall purport of pleadings. Thus, the Defendant’s appeal for subsequent completion of the instant case is a lawful appeal that satisfies the requirements for subsequent completion of procedural acts.

2. Basic facts

A. B driving a taxi vehicle at around 05:40 on December 26, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff-motor vehicle”) and driving a taxi at around 05:40, in violation of the signal of the commercial street intersection in the upstream of Daegu Suwon-gu, and straighted from the middle Ne-distance bank to the right-side bank.