1. All appeals filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) are dismissed.

2. The appeal cost is borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

1. The reasoning of the appellate court’s judgment citing the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the part against the Defendants in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following appellate parts, and thus, it shall be quoted in accordance with

From the 13th first reduction of the judgment of the first instance to the 14th 13th third, the first reduction is as follows:

1) Since January 24, 1997, the Defendant C occupied the part of Defendant C’s possession of the land Nos. 1 and 3 until then since January 24, 1997, which is his mother’s death, and thus, the prescription period has expired.

In full view of the evidence evidence Nos. 24 and 25 (the appellate court confirmed the original of the relevant evidence submitted as a copy on the date of pleading on June 11, 2020), evidence Nos. 26, 27, and the purport of the whole pleadings, it is recognized that S entered into a lease agreement with the Plaintiff on December 18, 191, and occupied the relevant land by leasing it from the Plaintiff, and that C succeeded to the possession of the part of the Defendant C out of the relevant land after S’s death.

If an inheritor acquires possessory right through inheritance, he/she cannot assert only his/her possession regardless of his/her own possession, unless the inheritor commences his/her own possession with a new title. In cases where the possession of the representative is the possession of the other party, the possession of the person who succeeds to the possession by inheritance from the fleet does not change in its nature or form, and thus, such possession cannot be a sole possession unless there are special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da27273, Sept. 24, 2004). The possession of S constitutes a sole possession by the nature of his/her title, and the possession of Defendant C, who succeeds to it as it is, constitutes a separate possession.

Therefore, Defendant C’s assertion based on the premise that Defendant C has occupied the relevant occupied part cannot be accepted.

2. The defendant B was married with T on July 9, 1981 and occupied the part of the defendant B's possession of the land 3 and 6 until then since that time.