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(영문) 대전지방법원 2017.08.17 2017노1906
권리행사방해
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. In light of the fact that the Defendant borrowed money from a credit service provider as security for a motor vehicle designated as a motor vehicle designated in the instant facts charged (hereinafter “motor vehicle”), but thereafter, efforts were made to recover the said motor vehicle, and the said motor vehicle appears to have been exported abroad, and the Defendant did not have any participation therein, the Defendant did not have any intention to interfere with the exercise of the right.

However, the judgment of the court below convicting the defendant of the facts charged of this case is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the intention of obstructing the exercise of rights, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

B. The sentence of the lower court’s improper sentencing (4 months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the assertion of misunderstanding of legal principles, interference with the exercise of rights under Article 323 of the Criminal Act is established by the act of interference with another’s exercise of rights by taking, concealing, or destroying a special media record, such as his/her own property or electronic records, which is the object

In this context, the term “ciding” means impossible or considerably difficult conditions to detect the location of one’s own goods, etc. which are the object of another’s possession or right. If the exercise of right is likely to be obstructed, interference with the exercise of right is established and the exercise of right is interfered with in reality (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Do2230, May 17, 2017). 2) In light of the legal principles as seen earlier, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the court below based on the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court below, the Defendant borrowed money from a credit service provider in the name of a third party and transferred the instant vehicle to him/her as collateral, thereby making it impossible or considerably difficult to detect the location of the instant vehicle, and thereby, the victim is the mortgagee of the said vehicle.

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