1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. The facts that there is no dispute over the cause of the claim, and comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the pleadings in the written evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the Plaintiff is deemed to have supplied the Defendant with the secondary batteries equivalent to the sum of KRW 3,696,00 from May 3, 2011 to May 26, 2011. Therefore, the Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff the price of the goods 3,696,000, and delay damages therefor, barring any special circumstances.

2. Judgment on the defendant's defense

A. As to the assertion of return, the Defendant asserts that, on June 30, 2011, the goods supplied by the Plaintiff were returned in entirety due to defective goods, and that the Plaintiff settled the price of the goods with full payment.

However, it is not sufficient to recognize that the defendant returned defective goods and settled the price thereof only with the descriptions of the evidence Nos. 2, 3, and 4, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Therefore, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

B. The Defendant’s assertion that the statute of limitations expired is proved to have expired. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim constitutes a price for goods sold by the merchants and thus is subject to the short-term extinctive prescription of three years pursuant to Article 163 subparag. 6 of the Civil Act. However, it is apparent in the record that the application for the payment order of this case was filed on December 21, 201, which was three years from May 26, 201, the date of the Plaintiff’s last supply, and thus, the Plaintiff’s claim for the payment of goods expired by the statute of limitations.

I would like to say.

As to this, the Plaintiff re-claimed that the extinctive prescription was interrupted by demanding the Defendant to pay the price of goods on several occasions from July 28, 2011 to October 23, 2013. However, the Plaintiff urged the Defendant to pay the price of goods until October 23, 2013.

Even if this is merely a “peremptory notice” of the performance of obligation and does not take judicial action, etc. within six months thereafter, the interruption of prescription is null and void (Article 174 of the Civil Act). The Plaintiff is the Plaintiff.