1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. In the course of the disposition, the following facts: (a) the status of stay exemption (B-1) on August 24, 2015 of the date of entry into the Republic of Korea of the Kingdom of Marocco (B-1); (b) the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on February 23, 2016; (b) the date of the application for refugee status recognition; (c) the date of the decision on February 23, 2017; and (d) the date of the application for objection, which was sufficiently based on the grounds for refugee non-recognition recognition: the fact that there is no ground for recognizing the contents of the decision on April 18, 2017, as of the date of the application for objection; (d) the facts that there is no ground for recognizing the contents of the decision on December

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion is a national of the Kingdom of Morocco (hereinafter “Morocco”).

The plaintiff was Islamic school in 2013, and it was turned into the Mesian school in 2013, and this fact became known to not only the plaintiff's family but also the local people.

The plaintiff was threatened by not only his father but also young people in the region.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has left Morocco in the Republic of Korea.

As such, since the Plaintiff’s return to Morocco is likely to be detrimental to gambling, the Plaintiff ought to be recognized as a refugee.

B. Determination 1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines a refugee as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a foreigner who is a state of nationality unable to return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she had resided before entering the Republic of Korea due to such fear.” 2) In full view of the evidence and evidence in subparagraph 3 and the following circumstances revealed in the statement in subparagraph 3, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have “a well-founded fear of being injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion.”