1. The part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance shall be revoked;

2. The defendant is jointly with the co-defendant B of the first instance trial.

1. Basic facts

A. On February 4, 2012, the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”) with the Defendant and B, setting the deposit amount of KRW 85,00,000, and the term of lease from March 17, 2012 to March 17, 2014, with respect to the Seocho-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government D (hereinafter “instant building”) holding 302 shares of each of the Defendant and B, respectively.

At the time, B submitted to the Plaintiff a letter of delegation, a certificate of personal seal impression, and a copy of identification card prepared by the Defendant, and affixed the seal in the name of the Defendant as the Defendant’s agent, and the Plaintiff wired KRW 85,00,000 to the national bank account in the name of “B (I)”, a business passbook.

B. Of the power of delegation submitted under the name of the defendant at the time of the instant lease agreement, the term "lease: Urban Residential Housing of Seocho-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government D New Construction Corporation, Representative: B, and matters to be delegated by proxy: all acts due to the construction of urban residential housing and the sale of 26 households."

C. On January 15, 2014, the Plaintiff notified that he/she would not wish to renew the instant lease agreement to B, and that he/she would return the lease deposit after the termination of the instant lease agreement.

[Ground of recognition] Each entry of Gap 2 through 6 (including paper numbers) and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. The parties' assertion

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion (1) concluded the instant lease agreement with B who lawfully represented the Defendant, and the Defendant and B are jointly obligated to refund the lease deposit to the Plaintiff.

(2) Even if B concluded the instant lease agreement beyond the authority delegated by the Defendant, the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff, has reasonable grounds to believe that B had the authority to conclude the instant lease agreement on behalf of the Defendant, and thus, the Defendant is liable in accordance with the legal doctrine on the apparent representation under Article 126 of the Civil Act.

(3) The defendant is a lease contract of this case.