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(영문) 서울북부지방법원 2017.07.12 2016나38489
채무부존재확인
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

[Claim]

Reasons

1. The reasons for the acceptance of the judgment of the court of first instance are as follows: (a) the defendant added the following “2. Additional Judgment” as to the assertion that the defendant emphasizes or adds to this court; and (b) the witness C’s testimony of the court of first instance as “part of the witness C’s testimony” of the court of first instance is deemed as “part of the witness C” of the court of first instance; and (c) therefore, it is identical to the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance.

2. Additional determination

A. The Defendant asserts that, since C, an employee of the Plaintiff, had been aware of the fact that the subdivision factory was not operated for two or three years, the Plaintiff was aware of such fact. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the exclusion period was excessive since one month after the Plaintiff became aware of the Plaintiff’s breach of duty to notify the termination of the insurance contract on July 15, 2015.

B. An insurance solicitor under the Insurance Business Act is merely a person mediating the conclusion of an insurance contract on behalf of a specific insurer, and there is no authority to conclude an insurance contract on behalf of the insurer, and there is no authority to receive notice or notification from the policyholder or the insured against the insurer. Thus, even if the insurance solicitor was aware of the “the risk of the occurrence of the insurance accident substantially changes or increases,” which is the subject of the duty to notify, it cannot be said that the insurer was aware

(See Supreme Court Decision 2006Da19672, 19689, Jun. 30, 2006). C.

In light of the above legal principles, it is acknowledged that C had mediated the conclusion of the insurance contract of this case as an insurance solicitor, according to the statement of No. 1, and witness of the first instance trial, and the purport of witness C of the first instance trial. Thus, even if C knew of “the risk of insurance accident” subject to notification after the conclusion of the insurance contract, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff, the insurer, was aware of the above facts. Thus, the Defendant’s testimony on a different premise.

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