Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part of conviction against Defendant A and the judgment of the court of second instance shall be reversed.

Defendant

A. Imprisonment.

1. Of the facts charged against Defendant A, the lower court dismissed the prosecution as to the violation of the Illegal Check Control Act with respect to each party check at the end of the attached Table 1, 17, 19, and 21, and convicted the remainder of the facts charged.

However, since Defendant A appealed from the judgment of the court of first instance on the grounds of unfair sentencing and did not appeal both the prosecutor and the Defendant to the dismissal part of the public prosecution, the dismissal part of the judgment of first instance becomes final and conclusive separately, and only the remaining guilty part of the judgment of first instance is subject to the judgment of this court.

2. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The punishment sentenced by the lower court against Defendant A (the 2 years of imprisonment with prison labor for the first instance judgment, and the 2 months of imprisonment with prison labor for the second instance judgment) is too unreasonable.

B. The prosecutor (as to Defendant B, mistake of fact) was merely a nominal lender and did not participate in the management of the company at all.

Even if a representative director in form entered into a check contract with the bank, and can be predicted that there was a possibility of not being paid on the date of presentation at the time of the issuance of the check in this case in light of various circumstances, and thus, the crime of violating the Illegal Check Control Act was established, the court below acquitted Defendant B of the facts charged. The court below erred in the misapprehension of facts, which affected the conclusion

3. Judgment on the grounds for the prosecutor’s appeal (Defendant B)

A. The crime of violation of Article 2 (2) of the Illegal Number of Securities and Exchange Control Act is established when a check is issued despite the recognition or foreseeable possibility of not being paid on the date for presentation due to the shortage of deposits (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Do115, Mar. 24, 1981; 79Do1334, Dec. 11, 1979; 94Do1799, Nov. 8, 1994). Therefore, the defendant is a bank as a representative director in the form of a bank.