logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 대전지방법원공주지원 2016.08.18 2016가단20618
물품대금
Text

1. The Defendant’s KRW 78,066,240 as well as the Plaintiff’s annual rate of 6% from March 5, 2015 to August 18, 2016, and the following.

Reasons

1. The Defendant asserts to the effect that the instant lawsuit filed against the Defendant against the Defendant is unlawful as it was against a non-party-qualified person, since the Defendant did not have taken over the business of “C” operated by the Defendant, and there is no promise to repay the Plaintiff’s livestock product price liability.

However, in a performance suit, the plaintiff's standing to be a party is nominal upon the plaintiff's own claim and such judgment is added to the judgment as to the propriety of the claim (Supreme Court Decision 92Da11848 delivered on June 12, 1992). If the plaintiff files the suit in this case with the purport that he is also liable to pay the price of the goods to the defendant, the defendant has the standing to be the defendant, so the above argument that contests the standing

2. Article 42(1) of the Commercial Act provides that, in general, Article 42(1) of the Commercial Act provides that a transferee who continues to use a trade name is liable to repay obligations arising from the transferor’s business operations, the obligor’s business credit is most substantially secured by the obligor’s business assets. Although the obligor’s business credit is not succeeded, in cases where the fact of the transfer of business or the failure to succeed to obligations is difficult to prove externally, and the obligee loses an opportunity to pursue obligations to the obligee, the obligor is also liable to pay obligations to the assignee. Thus, the same does not apply to the trade name used by the transferor and the trade name used by the transferee, unless the transferee’s trade name and the trade name used by the transferee are identical.

(See Supreme Court Decision 96Da8826 delivered on April 14, 1998, etc.). However, according to the overall purport of Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2 and Gap evidence Nos. 3, the Plaintiff’s purpose is to distribute, process, sell agricultural and livestock products.

arrow