(a)the legality of the previous imposition disposition that has been cancelled on the grounds of procedural defects and that the content and the grounds for taxation are the same;

B. Whether the construction mutual aid association's lending of money to members through the payment method of interest constitutes an unfair act

C. Whether the act of responding to a lawsuit constitutes a judicial claim, which is a cause interrupting prescription

A. If the preceding disposition is revoked on the ground that there was an error in the formal procedural aspect that the grounds for calculating the amount of tax are not specified in the notice for tax payment, the tax authority may supplement the defect and make the inventory disposition based on the same content as that of the preceding disposition.

B. In a case where the construction mutual aid association loans the operating funds for three-month ordinary time and the construction funds for which the completion date of the completion date of the loan is scheduled, and the interest is received from the members at the time of the principal repayment without receiving them at the time, this constitutes an unfair act even if it was for the achievement of its own business purpose even if it was to achieve the profit of the association equivalent to the fixed interest calculated at the time of the date of completion of the contract by giving the members under the special relationship under Article 20 of the Corporate Tax Act and Article 46 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act, thereby allocating the profit of the association equivalent to the same amount calculated at the time

C. The act of responding by the taxation authority based on the premise that the taxation is effective is not an act of exercising the right by the right holder itself, and thus cannot be deemed as a judicial claim, which is a cause interrupting prescription.

Article 168 of the Civil Act; Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 20 of the Corporate Tax Act; Article 46 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act

Construction Financial Cooperative

The director of the tax office

1. The disposition that the Defendant imposed on the Plaintiff as of June 4, 1984, imposed on the Plaintiff at an occasional amount of KRW 15,845,340 and KRW 3,395,910 for the business year of December 31, 1978, and the disposition that appropriated for the above disposition of imposition of KRW 19,241,250 for the national tax refund as of June 13, 1984 ( corporate tax of KRW 15,845,340 and KRW 3,395,910 for the defense tax of KRW 15,845,340) and KRW 19,250 for the national tax refund as of June 13, 1984 is revoked.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. Three minutes of the lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendant.

In addition to the decision as stated in the above, the disposition imposing corporate tax amount of KRW 27,49,650 for the business year of December 1, 1979 (the same date as March 1, 1979) and KRW 389,970 for corporate tax and KRW 83,570 for the defense tax amount of KRW 32,919,820 for the national tax refund as of June 13, 1984 and KRW 32,919,820 for the national tax refund as of June 13, 1984 ( corporate tax amount of KRW 27,109,680 and KRW 5,810,140 for the defense tax amount of KRW 389,970 for the business year of December 1, 1979 and KRW 5,810 for the defense tax amount of KRW 83,570 for each disposition is revoked.

The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

피고가 원고에 대하여 1984.6.4.자로 원고의 1978. 사업년도(1978.1.1.-같은해 12.31.)에 대한 수시분 법인세 금 15,845,340원 및 방위세 금 3,395,910원과 1979. 사업년도(1979.1.1.-같은해 12.31.)에 대한 수시분 법인세 금 27,499,650원 및 방위세 금 5,893,710원의 부과처분을 한 사실은 당사자 사이에 다툼이 없고, 성립에 다툼이 없는 갑 제1,2호증(각 납세고지서), 갑 제3호증(통지서), 갑 제4호증(결정서), 갑 제5호증의 1(결정통지), 2(결정서), 갑 제6호증의 1(판결), 2(확정증명), 을 제1호증의 1 내지 3, 을 제2호증의 1 내지 3(각 결의서 및 부속서류)의 각 기재에 변론의 전취지를 보태어 보면, 원고는 1979.2.14. 원고의 1978. 사업년도(1978.1.1.-같은해 12.31.)의 결산을 확정하고 같은해 3.2. 위 사업년도의 법인세과세표준을 금 2,973,381,992원으로 신고하면서 그에 대한 법인세 금 1,188,552,796원과 방위세 금 363,989,510원을 자진납부(각 자진예납세액 포함)하였고, 1980.2.14. 원고의 1979. 사업년도(1979.1.1.-같은해 12.31.)의 결산을 확정하고 같은달 29. 위 사업년도의 법인세과세표준을 금 2,783,185,545원으로 신고하면서 그에 대한 법인세 금 1,112,474,218원과 방위세 금 440,352,629원을 자진납부(각 예납세액 포함)한 사실, 피고는 원고의 위 신고내용에 잘못이 있다하여 장부, 기타 증빙서류에 의하여 원고의 위 각 사업년도의 소득금액을 실지 조사한 결과 원고는 건설업면허를 받은 조합원들의 출자로 구성된 특수법인으로서 그 조합원들에게 대출기한을 보통 3개월 동안으로 하는 운영자금과 대출기간을 공사준공예정일 또는 1년으로 하는 시공자금을 대출하면서 그 이자를 매월 월단위로 제때에 받아들이는 정상적인 이자수령방법에 의하지 아니하고 원금변제시에 일시불로 후이자로 받은 사실을 밝혀내고, 원고는 그 후취일수에 해당하는 약정이자액에 구 법인세법시행령(1982.12.31. 대통령령 제10978호로 개정되기 전의 법령) 제47조 제1항 소정의 당좌대월이자율을 적용하여 계산한 인정이자 상당액의 손해를 입은 반면 원고와 특수관계에 있는 조합원들에게 위 금액상당의 원고의 이익을 분여한 것이 되어 이는 원고의 소득에 대한 조세의 부담을 부당하게 감소시켰고, 그밖에 이사장에 대한 인정상여대납액이 있다하여 법인세법 제20조 , 구 법인세법시행령 제47조 에 의하여 원고의 1978. 사업년도와 1979. 사업년도 행위 및 소득금액의 계산을 부인하고, 1978. 사업년도 과세표준액에 후취이자에 대한 인정이자 27,794,425원과 대납액에 대한 인정이자 650,924원을, 1979. 사업년도 과세표준액에 후취이자에 대한 인정이자 48,417,794원과 대납액에 대한 인정이자 694,994원을, 각 익금가산하여 원고가 신고한 1978. 사업년도의 과세표준금액을 금 3,001,681,291원으로, 1979. 사업년도의 과세표준금액을 금 2,832,299,833원으로, 각 갱정한 다음 별지세액 계산서와 같이 1978. 사업년도의 법인세 금 15,845,340원과 방위세 금 3,395,910원, 1979. 사업년도의 법인세 금 27,499,650원과 방위세 금 5,893,710원을 각 추가결정하여 1981.3.16.자로 원고에게 고지하였고, 원고는 이를 납부한 사실, 원고는 피고가 위와 같은 추가부과처분을 함에 있어 원고에게 세액산출근거를 고지하지 아니하였다는 등의 이유로 서울고등법원 81구771호 로 위 추가부과처분의 취소를 구하는 소송을 제기하였는바 1984.5.2 위 추가부가처분은 납세고지서에 과세년도, 세목, 세액 및 납부장소와 납부기한을 명시하였을 뿐 그 산출근거를 명시하지 아니하여 위법하다는 이유로 그 취소를 명하는 판결이 되었으며 피고가 이에 승복함으로서 위 판결은 확정된 사실, 위 판결후 피고는 세액산출근거를 명시하여 앞에 본 바와 같이 1984.6.4.자로 1978. 사업년도의 법인세 금 15,845,340원, 방위세 금 3,395,910원과 1979. 사업년도의 법인세 금 27,499,600원, 방위세 금 5,893,710원을 다시 고지한 후 같은달 13. 원고가 1981.3.16.자 추가처분에 따라 납부한 세금을 원고에게 반환하지 아니하고 위 재고지처분에 따른 징수조로 이를 충당한 사실을 각 인정할 수 있고 위 인정에 반하는 증거없다.

As to the claim that the above inventory disposition is lawful, the plaintiff first, the inventory disposition of this case goes against the res judicata effect of the final and conclusive judgment because it was inventories with the same content as the preceding disposition of March 16, 1981, which was revoked by the judgment. Second, the plaintiff union is a special juristic person established under the Construction Mutual Aid Association Act to promote the autonomous economic activities and economic status of union members by providing necessary guarantee and financing to union members, and it was granted benefits to union members upon the expiration date of the lending period, and thereby, did not receive interest for the purpose of unfairly reducing the plaintiff's taxable income, even though the plaintiff did not receive interest on the loans from union members at the time of each month and received interest through payment method, while the plaintiff received tax burden on the plaintiff's income was unjustly reduced. Third, it is unreasonable that the plaintiff's taxation disposition of this case should be revoked on the expiration date of the tax claim based on the premise that the plaintiff's taxation disposition of this case should be revoked on the date of repayment of interest under the loan agreement between the plaintiff and union members.

First of all, we examine whether the defendant's inventory disposition of June 4, 1984 conflicts with the res judicata effect. The defendant's additional imposition disposition of March 16, 1981 is unlawful, and then again issued inventory disposition of this case after cancellation is acknowledged as the above. However, the above judgment is merely cancelled the prior imposition disposition on the ground that there was no error in the formal procedure that the tax base is specified in the notice of tax payment. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion that it goes against res judicata effect is unreasonable. Second, we examine the plaintiff's assertion that the interest rate of the second-party owner's income is unreasonable, and that the plaintiff's additional imposition of interest on the second-party loan of this case constitutes a legitimate interest rate of 19 years, and that the plaintiff's additional imposition of interest on the second-party loan of this case is illegal, and that the plaintiff's additional imposition of interest on the second-party loan of this case is not allowed to reduce the amount of interest imposed on the corporation's own property or service because it is not allowed to reduce the amount of interest imposed on the corporation.

Thirdly, the plaintiff's assertion that the calculation of profits from the plaintiff's income amount is unlawful against the right settlement point by denying the actual receipt of profits from the plaintiff's interest on the repayment date and paying interest each month, and Article 17 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "the business year to which the profit and loss of a domestic corporation belongs belongs shall be the business year to which the date when the profit and loss are determined," and therefore, Article 17 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act provides that "the business year to which the profit and loss of a domestic corporation belongs belongs shall be the business year to which the date when the profit and loss are determined," adopts the so-called principle of confirmation of right that the obligation to receive profit and loss becomes final and conclusive so that the obligation to appropriate the profit and loss for the profit and loss in the business year shall be included in the calculation of the profit and loss of the business year." Since the normal interest payment method for the loan is received at the time of each month (see Supreme Court Decision 82Nu117, Dec. 13, 1983).

Finally, Article 26 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act, which was in force at the time of the business year of 1978, provides that a person who has income from a corporation in the business year shall submit to the Government the tax base of corporate tax on income in each business year and other necessary matters within 15 days from the date on which the settlement of accounts for each business year is established. Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that if the settlement of accounts for the business year is not determined within 45 days from the end of each business year, the 45th day shall be considered as the date on which the settlement of accounts is determined, and the provisions of Paragraph (1) shall apply. According to Paragraph (1) of Article 27 of the Framework Act on National Taxes, the right to collect national taxes shall be terminated if it is not exercised for 5 years from the time on which the right to collect national taxes can be exercised. Since the right to taxation established abstractly has been established for the purpose of collecting national taxes under Paragraph (1) of Article 27 of the Framework Act on National Taxes, the expiration date of 197 days following the date shall be 19.

The defendant issued a tax notice as of March 16, 1981 prior to the issuance of a tax disposition on June 4, 1984, and the progress of the statute of limitations has been suspended. However, the defendant argued that the proceedings of the statute of limitations had been suspended as the defendant's response suit in the lawsuit seeking revocation of the tax disposition by the plaintiff, and that the statute of limitations had been proceeded after May 2, 1984. However, the defendant's first disposition on March 16, 1981 revoked by the Seoul High Court's final judgment, as seen above, the first disposition on March 16, 1981, which was revoked by the above final judgment, became null and void retroactively, and thus, it cannot be recognized as having no effect of the interruption of prescription, and it cannot be viewed as having been a judicial claim, which is a cause for interruption of prescription, since the defendant's response to the lawsuit by the person entitled to taxation, which was premised on the validity of the disposition of imposition, does not directly exercise his right by the right holder.

Therefore, the disposition of imposition of corporate tax and defense tax for the business year of 1978 is a disposition imposed after the extinctive prescription has expired and thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case of this case of this case is sought to be revoked in the sense that the above disposition of this case is null and void as a result of the defendant's declaration, and it is reasonable to accept it within the scope of seeking revocation of the disposition appropriated for the above disposition of national tax refund of 19,241,250 won (15,845,340 won corporate tax and 3,395,910 won for defense tax) as of June 13, 1984, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the application of Article 8 of the Administrative Litigation Act, Articles 89 and 92 of the Civil Procedure Act. The remaining claims are without merit.

Judges Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Judge)