1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. Facts without dispute;

A. On January 2, 2019, F completed the registration of ownership transfer entered in the purport of the claim on the grounds of donation on December 31, 2018 with respect to the real estate listed in the separate sheet owned by Defendant D on January 2, 2019. (2) Defendant D completed the registration of ownership transfer recorded in the purport of the claim on May 24, 2019 with respect to the said real estate to Defendant E on the same day.

B. A party’s relationship 1) The F died on January 8, 2019, and the inheritor is Defendant D and the Plaintiffs, the spouse, who are the Plaintiffs. (2) Defendant E is not Defendant D’s children or F’s children.

2. The Plaintiffs asserted that: (a) Defendant D forged a donation contract and completed the registration of ownership transfer as stated in the purport of the claim; or (b) F concluded the said donation contract with the capacity of office; and (c) Defendant E, based on the premise that the registration of ownership transfer stated in the purport of the claim in Defendant D’s name and the registration of ownership transfer stated in the purport of the claim in Defendant E, are null and void, the Plaintiffs seek cancellation of each of the above registration of ownership transfer as to the inherited shares among

3. Determination

A. Since the presumption of ownership transfer registration with the burden of proof is presumed to have acquired ownership according to legitimate grounds for registration as well as third parties, it is presumed that the immediately preceding owner has acquired ownership. Thus, Supreme Court Decisions 94Da10160 Decided September 13, 1994; 76Da3010 Decided June 7, 197; 76Da3010 Decided June 7, 197; and 76Da3010 Decided June 7, 197; and 76Da3010, the plaintiffs

B. Around December 31, 2018 when the F’s donation contract was concluded, there is no objective evidence to acknowledge that the F had a state of his/her parliamentary capacity. However, according to the result of the F’s entrustment of the medical record appraisal with respect to evidence Nos. 5 (including a provisional number; hereinafter the same shall apply), evidence No. 13, and G hospitals, the F appears to have been able to express and communicate the consciousness at that time. Therefore, this part of the Plaintiffs’ assertion is reasonable.