1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, which cited this case, is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the following, thereby citing this case as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article

2. Under Article 166(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, the Plaintiff’s additional determination takes effect from the time when it can exercise its right. Article 6(3) of the Regulations on the Efficient Operation of Administrative Affairs provides, “Notwithstanding paragraph (2), if the document does not specify the effective time in the document, it shall take effect at the lapse of five days after the date of such public notice or public notice.”

Pursuant to this, the plaintiff could apply for the refund of charges from October 5, 2008, which was from October 31, 2008, when there was No. 2008-1023 of the Notice of Yangyang-si, and thus, the plaintiff can file an application for refund of charges from November 5, 2008. Thus, the plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations has not expired since November 5, 2013.

However, Article 6 of the Special Act on the Refund, etc. of Charges for School Sites stipulates, “The right to receive the charges shall expire upon the completion of prescription if it is not exercised within five years from the date this Act enters into force.” The extinctive prescription does not proceed from the time when the right becomes objectively created and it is possible to exercise the right. Here, “it is prohibited to exercise the right” refers to a case where there is an obstacle in the exercise of the right, for example, the passage of the period or the non-performance of the conditions, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Da15865, Sept. 9, 2010). However, it is difficult to view that the ground asserted by the Plaintiff alone has a legal obstacle in exercising the right to receive the charges pursuant to the above Act until November 4, 2008.

Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion is accepted.