1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

1. The reasons for this court's acceptance of the judgment of the court of first instance are as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the addition of "2. Additional Judgment" as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, it is citing this as it is in accordance with

2. Additional determination

A. As to whether title trust of the instant real estate was held by the Defendant, the Defendant’s assertion is the owner of the instant real estate and the network C (hereinafter “the network”).

(2) On the premise that Nonparty B received 2/13 shares of the instant real estate from the deceased due to the death of the deceased who owned the instant real estate, the Plaintiff’s claim on the premise that Nonparty B received 2/13 shares of the instant real estate cannot be accepted. 2) According to the overall purport of the written evidence No. 7 and the oral argument, the deceased may be recognized as having completed the registration of ownership transfer on September 5, 2002.

On the other hand, since a person registered as an owner of a real estate is presumed to have acquired the ownership by due process and cause, the fact that the registration was based on the title trust has the burden of proof for the claimant.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da82913, Jun. 23, 2015). Each of the items in subparagraphs 1 and 5-1 and 2 of the evidence Nos. 5-2, and testimony of witness F of the lower court is insufficient to recognize the fact that the above transfer registration was based on the title trust between the Defendant and the deceased, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Therefore, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

B. 1) As for the method of restitution, the Defendant’s assertion is with the first instance court’s order, if the Plaintiff orders the restoration to the original state by means of the restoration of the original portion of 2/13 shares out of the instant real estate, the Plaintiff’s exercise of rights by the remaining equity right holders, such as the Defendant, etc. in the event that a compulsory execution, such as provisional seizure, is subsequently conducted on the said shares, causes considerable impediment to the exercise of rights by the said other equity right holders. Therefore, the said amount should be restored