The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. In light of the fact that the Defendant had experienced the electronic financial transaction cases similar to the instant case even before committing the instant crime, it can be deemed that the Defendant, at the time of committing the instant crime, knew of the possibility that the means of access can be used for other purposes or could not be returned, and thus, the lower court found the Defendant not guilty of the instant facts charged, in so determining, erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine.

2. Determination

A. The lower court determined that the instant facts charged constitute a case where there is no proof of crime, and thus, acquitted.

The term “acquisition of the means of access” under Article 49(4)1 of the Electronic Financial Transactions Act means the transfer of the ownership or the right to dispose of the means of access on the basis of the transferor’s intention, and is not included in the act of obtaining “lease” or obtaining delegation for temporary use (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do14913, Feb. 9, 2012). According to the records, in light of the fact that the Defendant was subject to the disposition of suspension of indictment as to whether he/she was aware that he/she would have been used in the crime, it is true that there is a doubt that the Defendant would not transfer the means of access with the knowledge that he/she would have been used

However, the Defendant raised questions by deeming that a borrower requires the e-mail card to be opened, and the borrower sent his resident registration certificate and the business registration certificate by facsimile, and sent the e-mail card to trust and receive the e-mail card after opening the e-mail passbook, and submitted the above resident registration certificate and the business registration certificate, and did not seem to have received the price for sending the e-mail card, and the Defendant sent the e-mail card.