All appeals by the defendant and the prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant 1) Defendant 1 had mental and physical weakness under the influence of alcohol at the time of committing the instant crime with a person with intellectual disability with a third degree disability.

2) The sentence of the lower court’s improper sentencing (6 months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

B. The Prosecutor’s above sentence is too uneasible and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. According to the records on the assertion of mental and physical weakness, it is recognized that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a certain extent at the time of committing the instant crime as a person with a disability of Grade III with intellectual disability.

However, in full view of the following: (a) the process and means of the instant crime, the Defendant’s act before and after the instant crime, and the Defendant’s motive and circumstance at an investigative agency, which were duly adopted and investigated by the lower court; and (b) the Defendant did not seem to have reached a state where the right at the time of the instant crime and the ability

The above assertion by the defendant is without merit.

B. In light of the fact that the sentencing of sentencing on the grounds of statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the matters that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing conditions are not changed in comparison with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it. Although the sentencing of the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the grounds that the sentencing of the first instance court is somewhat different from the appellate court’s view (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015), it is desirable to reverse the judgment of the first instance court and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not vary from the first instance court’s judgment on the grounds that new materials are not submitted in the trial court’s ex post facto, and there is no change in the sentencing conditions in this case.