The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten months.

However, the period of two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

1. Summary of the facts charged and the judgment of the court below

(a) Where a person who departs from the Republic of Korea with permission for overseas travel before being transferred to the first national service of the summary of the facts charged makes it impracticable to return to the Republic of Korea, he/she shall obtain permission for overseas travel or extension of the period by January 15 of the year in which he/she becomes 18 years of age;

Nevertheless, on July 30, 1993, the Defendant did not obtain permission for the extension of the period of overseas travel or the extension of the period from the head of the Military Affairs Administration until January 15, 1994, when he left the Republic of Korea by using tourism visa to the United States.

B. The judgment of the court below is based on the premise that the crime of this case is terminated after the lapse of January 15, 1994 of the year in which the defendant becomes 18 years of age and the statute of limitations is in progress from that time. The above crime is punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years under Articles 94 and 70 (3) of the former Military Service Act (amended by Act No. 6749 of Dec. 5, 2002). Thus, the court below held that under Article 3 of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8730 of Dec. 21, 2007), Article 249 (1) 5 of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8730 of Dec. 21, 2007), the statute of limitations is three years, and the defendant for domestic affairs had been staying in the United States for the purpose of escaping criminal punishment.

Even if deemed, the statute of limitations in the instant case is suspended from January 1, 1997, which was the enforcement date of the amended Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 5054, Dec. 29, 1995), and from November 25, 2015, which was the day before the date of entry of the Defendant, during the period from January 16, 1994 to December 31, 196, for which the Defendant’s crime stated in the facts charged was committed, until November 26, 2015, which was the date of entry.

It should be seen that the prosecution of this case was dismissed on the ground that it is evident that the prosecution of this case was filed on December 31, 2015 after three years from the date of the completion of the crime, even if the period, which can be deemed to have been suspended as seen above, was excluded.

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